

EXHIBIT 26

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

2014 JUN 27 A 9:35

CLERK US DISTRICT COURT
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, a
Washington corporation, and FS-ISAC, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN DOES 1-8, CONTROLLING A
COMPUTER BOTNET THEREBY
INJURING PLAINTIFFS, AND THEIR
CUSTOMERS AND MEMBERS,

Defendants.

Civil Action No: 1:14 cv 811
LOG/TEB

FILED UNDER SEAL

**EX PARTE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

Plaintiffs Microsoft Corp. ("Microsoft") and Financial Services – Information Sharing And Analysis Center, Inc. ("FS-ISAC") (collectively "Plaintiffs") have filed a complaint for injunctive and other relief pursuant to: (1) the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030); (2) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701); (3) the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(a)(1), 1125(a), (c)); and (4) the common law of trespass, unjust enrichment and conversion. Plaintiffs have moved *ex parte* for an emergency temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted pursuant to Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (the Lanham Act), and 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (the All-Writs Act).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Having reviewed the papers, declarations, exhibits, and memorandum filed in support of Plaintiffs' Application for an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order, the Court hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and there is good cause to believe that it will have jurisdiction over all parties hereto; the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendants John Does 1-8 ("Defendants") under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701), the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125) and the common law of trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment and conversion.

2. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have engaged in and are likely to engage in acts or practices that violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701), the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125) and constitute trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment and conversion, and that Microsoft is, therefore, likely to prevail on the merits of this action;

3. Microsoft owns the registered trademarks "Internet Explorer," "Microsoft," and "Windows" used in connection with its services, software and products. FS-ISAC's member organizations have invested in developing their brands, trademarks, and trade names in association with the financial services they offer.

4. There is good cause to believe that, unless Defendants are restrained and enjoined by Order of this Court, immediate and irreparable harm will result from the Defendants' ongoing violations. The evidence set forth in Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Preliminary Injunction ("TRO Application"), and the accompanying declarations and exhibits, demonstrates that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claim that Defendants have engaged in violations of the foregoing law by:

- a. intentionally accessing and sending malicious software to the protected computers and operating systems of the customers or associated member organizations of Microsoft and FS-ISAC, without authorization and exceeding authorization, in order to infect those computers and make them part of the computer botnet known as the “Shylock” botnet (the “botnet”);
- b. sending malicious code to configure, deploy and operate a botnet;
- c. generating and sending unsolicited messages through Microsoft’s Skype application and service that falsely indicate they are from or approved by Microsoft;
- d. creating false websites that falsely indicate that they are associated with or approved by Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ member organizations;
- e. using deceptive telephone numbers purporting to be associated with FS-ISAC’s member organizations, in order to steal computer users’ credentials;
- f. stealing personal and financial account information from computer users;
- g. using stolen information to steal money from the financial accounts of those users; and
- h. delivering malicious code.

5. There is good cause to believe that if such conduct continues, irreparable harm will occur to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ customers and member organizations, and the public. There is good cause to believe that the Defendants will continue to engage in such unlawful actions if not immediately restrained from doing so by Order of this Court;

6. There is good cause to believe that immediate and irreparable damage to this Court’s ability to grant effective final relief will result from the sale, transfer, or other disposition or concealment by Defendants of botnet command and control software that is hosted at and otherwise operates through the Internet domains and domain name servers listed in Appendix A and the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses listed in Appendix B, and from the destruction or concealment of other discoverable evidence of Defendants’ misconduct available

at those locations if Defendants receive advance notice of this action. Based on the evidence cited in Microsoft's TRO Application and accompanying declarations and exhibits, Plaintiffs are likely to be able to prove that:

- a. Defendants are engaged in activities that directly violate United States law and harm Plaintiffs and the public, including Plaintiffs' customers and member-organizations;
- b. Defendants have continued their unlawful conduct despite the clear injury to the foregoing interests;
- c. Defendants are likely to delete or to relocate the botnet command and control software at issue in Plaintiffs' TRO Application and the harmful, malicious, and trademark infringing software disseminated through the Internet domains, IP Addresses, and name servers to warn their associates engaged in such activities if informed of Plaintiffs' action; and
- d. Defendants are likely to warn their associates engaged in such activities if informed of Plaintiffs' action.

7. Plaintiffs' request for this emergency *ex parte* relief is not the result of any lack of diligence on Plaintiffs' part, but instead based upon the nature of Defendants' unlawful conduct. Therefore, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), good cause and the interest of justice require that this Order be Granted without prior notice to Defendants, and accordingly, Plaintiffs are relieved of the duty to provide Defendants with prior notice of Microsoft's motion;

8. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have specifically directed their activities to computers of Plaintiffs' customers and member organizations located in the Eastern District of Virginia, have engaged in illegal activity using the Internet domains and domain name servers identified in Appendix A to this Order by directing malicious botnet code and content to said computers of Plaintiffs' customers and member organizations; and using the IP addresses identified in Appendix B to this Order that are registered to command and control

servers located at hosting companies set forth in Appendix B, by directing malicious botnet code and content to said computers of Plaintiffs' customers and member organizations, to further perpetrate their fraud on Plaintiffs' customers and member organizations. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have directed said malicious botnet code and content through certain instrumentalities – specifically the computer networks of the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) identified in Appendix C to this Order that Microsoft's customers use to access the Internet, and the hosting companies and domain registries identified in Appendices A and B to this Order.

9. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have engaged in illegal activity by using the networks of the ISPs identified in Appendix C and the hosting facilities and domain registration facilities of the companies in Appendices A and B, to deliver from the Internet domains, domain name servers, and IP Addresses identified in Appendices A and B, the malicious botnet code and content that Defendants use to maintain and operate the botnets to the computers of Plaintiffs' customers and member organizations.

10. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have engaged in illegal activity by using deceptive and fake telephone numbers specifically to steal computer users' login and/or financial account credentials and to use such credentials to steal funds from such users.

11. There is good cause to believe that to immediately halt the injury caused by Defendants, Defendants must be prohibited from sending malicious botnet code and content from the Internet domains, the domain name servers, and the IP Addresses identified in Appendices A and B to computers of Plaintiffs' customers. There is good cause to believe that to immediately halt the injury caused by Defendants, Defendants must also be prohibited from sending or receiving telephone calls to steal computer users' credentials and continue their fraudulent conduct on Plaintiffs' customers and member organizations.

12. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have engaged in illegal activity using the Internet domains and domain name services identified in Appendix A to this Order to host the command and control software and content used to maintain and operate the botnet. There is good cause to believe that to immediately halt the injury caused by Defendants, each of

Defendants' current and prospective domains set forth in Appendix A must be immediately redirected to the Microsoft-secured name-servers named NS9.microsoftinternetsafety.net and NS10.microsoftinternetsafety.net and thus made inaccessible to Defendants.

13. There is good cause to believe that to immediately halt the injury caused by Defendants, the ISPs identified in Appendix C and the hosting companies identified in Appendix B should take reasonable steps to block incoming and/or outgoing traffic on their respective networks that originates or has been sent from and/or to the IP Addresses identified in Appendix B and the ".su," ".ru" and ".at" domains identified in Appendix A, such that said traffic will not reach victim end-user computers on the ISPs' respective networks and/or the computers at the foregoing IP Addresses and domains.

14. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have engaged in illegal activity using the IP Addresses identified in Appendix B to host the command and control software and content used to maintain and operate the botnet. There is good cause to believe that in order to immediately halt the injury caused by Defendants and to ensure the future prosecution of this case it not rendered fruitless by attempts to delete, hide, conceal, or otherwise render inaccessible the software components that create, distribute, and are involved in the creation, perpetuation, and maintenance of the botnet and prevent the creation and distribution of unauthorized copies of the registered trademarks of Microsoft and FS-ISAC's member organizations and carry out other harmful conduct, with respect to the Defendants' most current, active command and control servers hosted at the IP Addresses, the following actions should be taken. The ISPs identified in Appendix C and the hosting companies identified in Appendix B should take reasonable steps to block incoming and/or outgoing traffic on their respective networks that originates or has been sent from and/or to the IP Addresses identified in Appendix B, such that said traffic will not reach victim end-user computers on the ISPs' respective networks and/or the computers at the IP Addresses in Appendix B, and should take other reasonable steps to block such traffic to and/or from any other IP addresses to which Defendants may move the botnet infrastructure, identified by Plaintiffs and which the Court may order to be

subject to this Order, to ensure that Defendants cannot use such infrastructure to control the botnet.

15. There is good cause to believe that to immediately halt the injury, the execution of this Order should be carried out in a coordinated manner by Plaintiffs and by the domain registries identified in Appendix A, the hosting companies identified in Appendix B, and the ISPs identified in Appendix C to this Order on or about 11:30 a.m. Eastern Standard Time on July 8, 2014, or such other date and time within eight days of this order as may be reasonably requested by Plaintiffs.

16. There is good cause to believe that Defendants will routinely update the Internet domains, domain name servers, and IP addresses associated with the Shylock Botnet, and that Plaintiffs may identify and update the domains and IP addresses to this Order as may be reasonably necessary to account for additional Internet domains, domain name servers, and IP addresses associated with the Shylock Botnet just prior to the July 8, 2014 execution of this Order.

17. There is good cause to permit notice of the instant Order, notice of the Preliminary Injunction hearing and service of the Complaint by formal and alternative means, given the exigency of the circumstances and the need for prompt relief. The following means of service are authorized by law, satisfy Due Process, and satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) and are reasonably calculated to notify Defendants of the instant order, the Preliminary Injunction hearing and of this action: (1) by personal delivery upon Defendants who provided accurate contact information in the U.S., if any, (2) personal delivery through the Hague Convention on Service Abroad or similar treaties upon defendants who provided accurate contact information in foreign countries that are signatory to such treaties, if any, (3) transmission by email, facsimile, mail and/or personal delivery to the contact information provided by Defendants to their domain registrars and hosting companies and as agreed to by Defendants in their domain registration and/or hosting agreements, (4) publishing notice on a publicly available Internet website and/or in newspapers in the communities where Defendants are believed to reside.

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, Defendants, their representatives and persons who are in active concert or participation with them are temporarily restrained and enjoined from: (1) intentionally accessing and sending malicious software or code to Plaintiffs and the protected computers and operating systems of Plaintiffs' customers and associated member organizations, without authorization, in order to infect those computers and make them part of any botnet, (2) sending malicious code to configure, deploy and operate a botnet, (3) generating and sending unsolicited messages that falsely indicate said messages are from or approved by Microsoft or others; (4) creating false websites that falsely indicated that they are associated with or approved by Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' member organizations; (5) configuring, deploying, operating, or otherwise participating in or facilitating the botnet described in the TRO Application, including but not limited to the command and control software hosted at and operating through the Internet domains, domain name servers, and IP addresses set forth herein and through any other component or element of the botnet in any location; (6) using deceptive telephone numbers purporting to be associated with Plaintiffs' member organizations in order to steal computer users' credentials; (7) stealing information, money, or property from Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' customers, or Plaintiffs' member organizations; (8) misappropriating that which rightfully belongs to Plaintiffs, their customers, or their associated member organizations or in which Plaintiffs', their customers, or their associated member organizations has a proprietary interest; or (9) undertaking any similar activity that inflicts harm on Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' customers or member associations, or the public.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, Defendants, their representatives and persons who are in active concert or participation with them are temporarily restrained and enjoined from (1) using and infringing Microsoft's trademarks, including specifically Microsoft's registered trademarks "Internet Explorer," "Microsoft" or "Windows," bearing registration numbers 2872708, 2463526 and 2277112; the trademarks of financial institution members of FS-ISAC and/or other trademarks, trade names, service marks, or Internet Domain addresses or names; (2)

using in connection with Defendants' activities, products or services any false or deceptive designation, representation or description of Defendants' or of their activities, whether by symbols, words, designs or statements, which would damage or injure Plaintiffs or their member organizations or give Defendants an unfair competitive advantage or result in deception of consumers; or (3) acting in any other manner which suggests in any way that Defendants' activities, products or services come from or are somehow sponsored by or affiliated with Microsoft, or passing off Defendants' activities, products or services as Plaintiffs' or their member organizations.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to any currently registered Internet domains and domain name servers set forth in Appendix A, the domain registries located in the United States shall take the following actions:

- A. Maintain unchanged the WHOIS or similar contact and identifying information as of the time of receipt of this Order and maintain the domains with the current registrar;
- B. The domains shall remain active and continue to resolve in the manner set forth in this Order;
- C. Prevent transfer or modification of the domains by Defendants or third parties at the registrar;
- D. The domains shall be redirected to secure servers by changing the authoritative name servers to NS9.microsoftinternetsafety.net and NS10.microsoftinternetsafety.net and, as may be necessary, the IP address associated with name server or taking other reasonable steps to work with Microsoft to ensure the redirection of the domains and to ensure that Defendants cannot use them to control the botnet.
- E. Take all steps required to propagate to the foregoing changes through the DNS, including domain registrars;
- F. Preserve all evidence that may be used to identify the Defendants using the domains.
- G. Refrain from providing any notice or warning to, or communicating in any way

with Defendants or Defendants' representatives and refrain from publicizing this Order until this Order is executed in full, except as necessary to communicate with domain registrars and registries to execute this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to the currently registered Internet domains and domain name servers set forth in Appendix A, the non-U.S. domain registries set forth at Appendix A are respectfully requested, but not ordered, to comply with the foregoing steps, in order to protect the integrity and security of the Internet, to protect the domain registries' own systems, to protect end-user victims of the botnet in all countries, to advance the public interest and to protect Plaintiffs and their customers and members from the botnet.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to any domains set forth in Appendix A that are currently unregistered, the domain registries and registrars located in the United States shall take the following actions:

A. Transfer the domains to the control of Microsoft, such that Microsoft is the registrant with control over hosting and administration of the domains. Domains should be transferred to Microsoft's account at the sponsoring registrar MarkMonitor.

B. The WHOIS registrant, administrative, billing and technical contact and identifying information should be the following;

Domain Administrator
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
United States
Phone: +1.4258828080
Facsimile: +1.4259367329
domains@microsoft.com

C. The domains shall be made active and shall resolve in the manner set forth in this order or as otherwise specified by Microsoft.

D. The domains shall be assigned the authoritative name servers NS9.microsoftinternetsafety.net and NS10.microsoftinternetsafety.net and, as may be necessary, the IP address associated with name servers or taking such other reasonable steps to work with

Microsoft to ensure that the domains and subdomains are put within Microsoft's control, and to ensure that Defendants cannot use them to control the botnet.

E. Refrain from providing any notice or warning to, or communicating in any way with Defendants or Defendants' representatives and refrain from publicizing this Order until this Order is executed in full, except as necessary to communicate with domain registrars or registries to execute this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to the currently unregistered Internet domains and domain name servers set forth in Appendix A, the non-U.S. domain registries set forth at Appendix A are respectfully requested, but not ordered, to comply with the foregoing steps, in order to protect the integrity and security of the Internet, to protect the domain registries' own systems, to protect end-user victims of the botnet in all countries, to advance the public interest and to protect Plaintiffs and their customers and members from the botnet.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to any of the IP Addresses set forth in Appendix B to this Order and with respect to any of the ".su," ".ru" and ".at" domains set forth in Appendix A, the ISPs identified in Appendix D to this Order shall take reasonable best efforts to implement the following actions:

A. Without the need to create logs or other documentation, take reasonable steps to identify (1) incoming and/or outgoing Internet traffic on their respective networks that originates and/or is being sent from and/or to the IP Addresses identified in Appendix B and (2) incoming and/or outgoing Internet traffic on their respective networks that originates and/or is being sent from and/or to the ".su," ".ru" and ".at" domains identified in Appendix A, that is directed to and/or from computers that connect to the Internet through the ISPs' respective networks;

B. Take reasonable steps to block (1) incoming and/or outgoing Internet traffic on their respective networks that originate and/or are being sent from and/or to the IP Addresses identified in Appendix B, and (2) incoming and/or outgoing Internet traffic on their respective networks that originates and/or is being sent from and/or to the ".su," ".ru" and ".at" domains

identified in Appendix A, that is directed to and/or from computers that connect to the Internet through the ISPs' respective networks;

C. Take other reasonable steps to block such traffic to and/or from any other IP addresses or domains to which Defendants may move the botnet infrastructure, identified by Microsoft in a supplemental request to this Order, to ensure that Defendants cannot use such infrastructure to control the botnet.

D. Refrain from providing any notice or warning to, or communicating in any way with Defendants or Defendants' representatives and refrain from publicizing this Order until this Order is executed in full, except as necessary to communicate with hosting companies, domains registries, the Plaintiffs or other ISPs to execute this order;

E. Not enable, and shall take reasonable steps to prevent, any circumvention of this order by Defendants, Defendants' representatives or any other person;

F. Provide reasonable assistance in implementing the terms of this Order and take no action to frustrate the implementation of this Order;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to the IP Addresses set forth in Appendix B and the ".su," ".ru" and ".at" domains identified in Appendix A, the non-U.S. ISPs set forth at Appendix C are respectfully requested, but not ordered, to comply with the foregoing steps, in order to protect the integrity and security of the Internet, to protect the domain registries' own systems, to protect end-user victims of the botnet in all countries, to advance the public interest and to protect Plaintiffs and their customers and members from the botnet.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to the IP Addresses in Appendix B, the hosting companies located in the United States shall take the following actions:

A. Take all reasonable steps necessary to completely block all access to and all traffic to and from the IP Addresses set forth in Appendix B by Defendants, Defendants' representatives, resellers, and any other person or computer, except as explicitly provided for in this Order;

B. Completely disable the computers, servers, electronic data storage devices, software, data or media assigned to or otherwise associated with the IP Addresses set forth in Appendix B and make them inaccessible from any other computer on the Internet, any internal network, or in any other manner, to Defendants, Defendants' representatives and all other persons, except as otherwise ordered herein;

C. Completely preserve the computers, servers, electronic data storage devices, software, data or media assigned to or otherwise associated with the IP Addresses set forth in Appendix B, and preserve all evidence of any kind related to the content, data, software or accounts associated with such IP addresses and such computer hardware, such that such evidence of Defendants' unlawful activities is preserved.

D. Completely, and until further order of this Court, suspend all services associated with the IP Addresses set forth in Appendix B;

E. Not enable, and shall take all reasonable steps to prevent, any circumvention of this order by Defendants or Defendants' representatives associated with the IP Addresses or any other person;

F. Log all attempts to connect to or communicate with the IP Addresses set forth in Appendix B;

G. Preserve, retain and produce to Plaintiffs all documents and information sufficient to identify and contact Defendants and Defendants' representatives operating or controlling the IP Addresses set forth in Appendix B, including any and all individual or entity names, mailing addresses, e-mail addresses, facsimile numbers and telephone numbers or similar contact information, including but not limited to such contact information reflected in billing, usage, access and contact records and all records, documents and logs associated with Defendants' or Defendants' Representatives' use of or access to the IP Addresses.

H. Refrain from providing any notice or warning to, or communicating in any way with Defendants or Defendants' representatives and refrain from publicizing this Order until this Order is executed in full, except as explicitly provided for in this Order;

I. Transfer any content and software hosted at the IP Addresses listed in Appendix B that are not associated with Defendants, if any, to new IP Addresses not listed in Appendix B; notify any non-party owners of such action and the new IP addresses, and direct them to contact Microsoft's counsel, Gabriel M. Ramsey, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, 1000 Marsh Road, Menlo Park, CA 90425-1015, gramsey@orrick.com, (Tel: 650-614-7400), to facilitate any follow-on action;

J. Provide reasonable assistance in implementing the terms of this Order and take no action to frustrate the implementation of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to the IP Addresses in Appendix B, the non-U.S. hosting companies set forth at Appendix B are respectfully requested, but not ordered, to comply with the foregoing steps, in order to protect the integrity and security of the Internet, to protect the hosting companies' own systems, to protect end-user victims of the botnet in all countries, to advance the public interest and to protect Plaintiffs and their customers and members from the botnet.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that copies of this Order, notice of the Preliminary Injunction hearing and service of the Complaint may be served by any means authorized by law, including (1) by personal delivery upon Defendants who provided accurate contact information in the U.S., if any; (2) personal delivery through the Hague Convention on Service Abroad or similar treaties upon defendants who provided accurate contact information in foreign countries that are signatory to such treaties, if any, (3) transmission by email, facsimile, mail and/or personal delivery to the contact information provided by Defendants to their domain registrars and/or hosting companies and as agreed to by Defendants in their domain registration and/or hosting agreements, (4) publishing notice on a publicly available Internet website and/or in newspapers in the communities where Defendants are believed to reside.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) that the Defendants shall appear before this Court on July 15, 2014 at 10:00^{AM} to show cause, if there is any, why this Court should not enter a Preliminary Injunction, pending final ruling

on the Complaint against the Defendants, enjoining them from the conduct temporarily restrained by the preceding provisions of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Microsoft shall post bond in the amount of \$200,000 as cash to be paid into the Court registry.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs may identify and update the domains and IP addresses to this Order as may be reasonably necessary to account for additional Internet domains, domain name servers, and IP addresses associated with the Shylock Botnet just prior to the July 8, 2014 execution of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants shall file with the Court and serve on Plaintiffs' counsel any answering affidavits, pleadings, motions, expert reports or declarations and/or legal memoranda no later than two (2) days prior to the hearing on Microsoft's request for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs may file responsive or supplemental pleadings, materials, affidavits, or memoranda with the Court and serve the same on counsel for the Defendants no later than one (1) day prior to the preliminary injunction hearing in this matter. Provided that service shall be performed by personal or overnight delivery, facsimile or electronic mail, and documents shall be delivered so that they shall be received by the other parties no later than 4:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) on the appropriate dates listed in this paragraph.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Entered this 27th day of June, 2014.

11:34 AM

/s/ [Signature]
Liam O'Grady
United States District Judge